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MARRYING UP: THE UNSETTLED LAW OF
IMMIGRATION MARRIAGE FRAUD AND
THE NEED FOR UNIFORM STATUTORY
GUIDELINES
MICHAEL VIRGA t
INTRODUCTION

For many Americans, the concept of illegal immigration
might conjure stereotypical images of a family wading across the
Rio Grande or a student who overstays her visa and then
disappears. This sort of immigration law violation might be
considered akin to a nation that left its back door open, only to
find that someone had snuck inside. However, it may come as a
surprise to many in the United States that not all illegal
immigration occurs in the shadows. In fact, violators of our
immigration laws are often welcomed at America's front door,
invited in, and then greeted with open arms-despite their
duplicitous intentions. This latter variety of illegal immigration
occurs under the cover of fraudulent marriage.
In such
arrangements, foreigners marry U.S. citizens or permanent legal
residents in order to gain preferential immigration treatment
and bypass the substantial waiting line for legal entry into
America.'
The United States has opened itself to this type of in-plainsight criminality in part through its enduring support for family
formation and integrity.2 it is a stated goal of this nation's
lawmakers, in the context of writing our immigration laws, to
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promote the preservation and reunification of family units.' This
goal is clearly evidenced in our nation's immigration preference
system, which affords priority status to those aliens who are
relatives or spouses of American citizens or permanent legal
residents.4
However, while this worthwhile goal is indeed
functioning to keep many families intact, it nevertheless allows
for certain foreign individuals and their domestic enablers to
take unfair advantage by breaking the law.5
Having become aware of the prevalence of immigration
marriage fraud, American lawmakers responded in 1986 by
enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) to combat this practice.' This statute,
drafted in response to the growing concern over the prevalence of
immigration marriage fraud, makes it a federal crime to enter
into a marriage for the purpose of evading American immigration
laws.7 Section 1325(c) and several concurrently passed pieces of
legislation provided new tools for the federal government's efforts
to identify and prosecute this admittedly elusive form of illegal
immigration.8
However, in the years since its enactment, § 1325(c) has
become the subject of divergent statutory interpretation among
federal courts, leading to contradictory results that have the
potential to seriously undermine federal enforcement efforts.9
This circuit split turns on a distinction over the intent with
Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements To Obtain Permanent
Resident Immigration Status: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration &
Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1985) [hereinafter
1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration Marriage Fraud] (statement of Sen. Alan K.
Simpson, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration & Refugee Policy).
' See generally 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154 (West 2014) (providing for preferential
classification of certain categories of familial relations); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)
(2012) (providing for preferential allocation of visas to family-sponsored
immigrants).
5 See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
6 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012). At the time of its enactment, this provision was
titled 8 U.S.C. § 1325(b). See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2(d)(2), 100 Stat. 3537 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325(c)).
' See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c); 1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration Marriage Fraud,
supra note 3, at 90 (statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Immigration & Refugee Policy) ("I appreciate the thoughtful testimony [on
increasing immigration marriage fraud]; it was well done. I think there is a need for
legislation. We are going to begin to draft that.").
s See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 § 2(a), (d)(2).
q See United States v. Ortiz-Mendez,
634 F.3d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2011)
(collecting cases).
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which an allegedly punishable marriage was entered."0 One
group of circuit courts has held that the statute can only be
interpreted to punish those who enter a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws." This so-called "establish
a life" test ("Build a Life") holds that a marriage is not
necessarily fraudulent, and therefore not necessarily punishable,
if the marriage was entered into with the intent of establishing a
joint spousal life-even if gaining immigration preference was an
additional motivating factor." The other group of circuit courts
has adopted what is known as the "evade the law" test ("Evade
the Law"). 13 This competing test holds that a person who has any
intent to evade immigration laws when marrying, regardless of
any other motivations, is subject to prosecution under the

statute.14
This Note argues that courts should interpret § 1325(c) as
applicable to anyone who enters a marriage with any intent of
evading immigration laws, regardless of any other underlying
motivations. Part I examines the motivations for and prevalence
of immigration marriage fraud, as well as the historical context
in which the statute in question was drafted. Part II analyzes
the unsettled landscape of § 1325(c)'s interpretation and
application, in addition to the competing arguments for the
respective tests. Part III argues for the universal adoption of the
Evade the Law standard, premised on the need for plain meaning
statutory interpretation and the imprudence of creating textually
unsupported statutory exceptions. Additionally, this argument
details several policy considerations, centered on congressional
intent and enforcement challenges, which support the adoption of
the Evade the Law standard. Part IV concludes by calling for
Supreme Court action on this split or, in the alternative,
legislative measures that Congress can undertake to settle this
question of statutory interpretation.

10 See id. at 839-40.

11Id. at 840.
12 United
States v. Aksu, Nos. RDB-12-00668, RDB-12-00669, 2013 WL
1898148, at *2 (D. Md. May 3, 2013); see also Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d at 839-40.
13 Aksu, 2013 WL 1898148, at *3.
14 See id.
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BACKGROUND

Immigration PreferenceAfforded to Alien Spouses

The phenomenon of immigration marriage fraud is directly
Our
linked to America's immigration preference system.15
nation's immigration laws place a premium on keeping families
intact. 6 This goal manifests itself in the form of expedited
immigration processing and acceptance of foreign relatives,
spouses of American citizens, and permanent legal residents.17
As a result, qualifying foreign spouses are allowed to bypass
immigration quotas and certain procedural hurdles, giving them
priority in receiving legal resident status. 8 Additionally, these
foreign spouses are afforded preference regardless of other
factors that might have normally disqualified the alien for legal
permanent admission into the country. 9
The preferential treatment of alien spouses is hugely
significant within the overall American immigration regime. In
2012, over thirty-five percent of those aliens receiving legal
permanent resident status did so through the spousal
This group totaled over 370,000 foreign
preferences.2 °
individuals and constituted the largest sub-category of familysponsored immigrants granted legal permanent resident status
in the United States. 2 The vast scale of this preference system,
as well as its attractiveness to defrauding aliens, is further
underscored by the limited avenues of legal entry to those wouldbe immigrants without the benefit of spousal or familial ties.2 2
15 See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
16 See 1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration Marriage Fraud, supra note 3

(statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration &
Refugee Policy) ("Our present immigration laws reserve our very most favored topdrawer status for spouses of American citizens, and the U.S. system, based to a large
degree upon the principle of family reunification, certainly there can be no more
important reunification than spouses, husband and wife.").
"7 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012) (providing for preferential allocation of visas to
family-sponsored immigrants); see also id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (exempting alien
immediate family members, including alien spouses, from statutory quotas on
immigration visas).
18 See RANDALL MONGER & JAMES YANKAY, U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2012, at 1-2 (2013).
'9 See 1985 Senate Hearingon ImmigrationMarriage Fraud,supra note 3, at 7
(statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, I.N.S.).
20 See MONGER & YANKAY, supra note 18, at 3.
21 See id.
22 See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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For example, the Diversity Visa Entrant program makes 50,000
permanent resident visas available each year to non-preference
foreigners from countries with low immigration rates to the
United States.2 3 In 2013, nearly eight million foreign citizens
applied for the program's 50,000 slots.2 4
While American immigration laws confer exceptional
benefits to alien spouses, there are still several procedural
hurdles designed to prevent fraud and abuse.25 Alien spouses
receive only conditional residency status when they marry a U.S.
citizen or a permanent legal resident within two years of their
application.2 6 After two years of marriage, both the alien spouse
and the alien spouse's domestic partner must provide U.S.
immigration officials with evidence of the genuineness of their
marriage.2
Furthermore, the spouses are often interviewed
separately by immigration officials and questioned on the details
of the relationship. 8 Immigration officials examine whether the
spouses make inconsistent statements about the details of the
marriage, as well as whether the spouses have established bona
29
If
fide ties such as cohabitation and joint bank accounts.
immigration officials are satisfied that the spouses have not
engaged in a fraudulent marriage, the alien spouse's residency
status will be changed from conditional to permanent. ° If not,
the alien may be subject to deportation and prosecution, and the
domestic spouse may likewise face criminal penalties.3
B.

The Great Potentialfor, and Expansive Reality of,
Immigration MarriageFraud
There are numerous structural incentives for aliens to enter
fraudulent marriages with U.S. citizens or permanent legal
residents.32
First, immigration quotas limit the number of
2 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't. of State, DV 2013 - Selected Entrants,
U.S. VISAS, http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types-5715.html
(last
visited Apr. 23, 2015).
24 Id.
25 See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
26 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(a), (h) (West 2013).
27 See id. § 1186a(d).
28 See id. § 1186a(d)(3); see also Nina Bernstein, Do You Take This Immigrant?,
N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2010, at MB1.
29 Bernstein, supra note 28.
3" See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(3)(B).
31 See id. § 1186a(c)(3)(C); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012).
32 See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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resident visas available to those immigrants without the
professional skills or familial ties necessary to qualify for
preferential treatment.3 Second, even for those aliens who do
qualify for an immigration preference, there is often a
substantial waiting period for admission that can last upwards of
several years. 34 Third, there is an extremely limited number of
permanent resident visas available relative to the expansive pool
of non-preferred foreign applicants.3 5 These factors, no doubt,
contribute to the attractiveness of fraudulent marriage as a
means of gaining expedited entry, or any entry for that matter,
into the United States.
Additionally, there are several non-structural factors that
exacerbate these systemic incentives toward marriage fraud. 6
For instance, expansive criminal enterprises have become quite
adept at facilitating fraudulent marriages between aliens and
U.S. citizens or permanent residents for the purpose of gaining
immigration preference.
Relatedly, there are many low-income
U.S. citizens who are willing to enter into a fraudulent marriage
38
in exchange for illicit compensation from the alien spouse.
Occasionally, fraudulent marriages are entered into by
sympathetic U.S. citizens or permanent legal residents in order
to keep an alien acquaintance or significant other in the
country. 9 In each of these instances, there is a shadow market
that is actively meeting the demands of a community with
limited legal immigration options. 4°
The prevalence of immigration marriage fraud is both well
documented and unsurprising.4 1
U.S. government estimates
suggest that upwards of thirty percent of the marriages that

MONGER & YANKAY, supra note 18, at 1.
See id. at 2.
See Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't. of State, supra note 23.
See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
3' 1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 13
(statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, I.N.S.); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 1.
38 1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 16
(statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, I.N.S.).
33
34
31
36

10 Id. at 13 ("Many United States citizens and permanent resident aliens will
marry because they 'feel sorry' for the alien who is facing deportation... or are
coerced by parents, lovers, or friends to participate in the shame to facilitate the
entry of their friends, relatives, relatives, or business acquaintances.").
40 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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result in aliens receiving resident visas are fraudulently entered
into. 42 Additionally, as many as 60,000 of these fraudulent
marriages evade detection each year. 43 These statistics are
indicative of a trend that has been in force since at least the
1980s. 44
C. Legislative Efforts To Combat Immigration MarriageFraud
and Enactment of§ 1325(c)
In the mid-1980s, congressional attention turned to the issue
of combatting immigration marriage fraud.45 Concern was rising
during this period over the increasing prevalence of this
practice.4 6
Estimates by the U.S. Immigration
and
Naturalization Service ("INS") determined that, in the early
1980s, as many as thirty percent of all marriages that resulted in
immigration preference were the product of fraud.47 Particularly
worrisome to lawmakers was the increasing role played by
criminal syndicates in arranging these fraudulent marriages.48
Additionally, enforcement agencies warned of complicit U.S.
citizens or permanent legal residents who were being pressured
into expedient marriages by alien friends or lovers.4 9
In testimony provided to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Immigration and Refugee Policy in 1985, the Commissioner of
the INS at the time, Alan Nelson, called for a series of reforms to
help curb the rise of immigration marriage fraud. 0 Nelson asked
congressional lawmakers to implement a two-year conditional
42 Stephen Kurkjian & Callum Borchers, A Marriageof a Dream and a Scheme;
Holyoke Woman Arranged Dozens of Sham Weddings for Illegal Immigrants, BOS.
GLOBE, Sept. 18, 2011, at 1.

43
4

Id.

1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 35
(statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, I.N.S.) (discussing a 1984 survey that
estimated that as many as thirty percent of all immigration preference-conferring
marriages occurring that year were fraudulent).
45 See generally 1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration Marriage Fraud, supra
note 3.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 35 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, I.N.S.).
48 Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Member, Subcomm. on
Immigration & Refugee Policy) ("[Miore horrendous is the fact that some people are
making profit off the business of arranging the subterfuge. I hope that not only will
the hearing be a success... but I hope that it leads to our ability to bring legislative
action to correct this situation which is indeed very serious.").
49 Id. at 13 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, I.N.S.).
'0 See id. at 17-18.
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residency status for alien spouses who gained an immigration
benefit through marriage, to be followed by a mandatory exit
interview that could determine whether the marriage was or was
not fraudulent.5 1 Additionally, the Commissioner called for
"aggressive criminal prosecution"5 2 and stated that the burden on
the government to prove fraudulent intent "must be eased."5 3
Furthermore, Commissioner Nelson argued that the alien's
intent at the time of the marriage should "not [be] an
ameliorating factor." 54 At the end of the hearing, Subcommittee
Chairman Senator Alan Simpson acknowledged the need for
legislation to remedy this situation and stated that his
Subcommittee would begin drafting it.55
A year later, in 1986, Congress responded to calls for reform
by passing the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of
1986 ("IMFA").56 The IMFA was a package of laws enacted to
both deter and punish immigration marriage fraud.
The
legislation included 8 U.S.C. § 1186a, which creates a two-year
conditional residency status for aliens who gain immigration
preference through marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent legal
resident.58 The IMFA also enacted § 1325(c), which makes it a
crime for anyone to "knowingly enter[] into a marriage for the
purpose of evading any provision of the immigration laws."59
Section 1325(c) imposes a penalty for violation of not more than
five years in prison or a fine of not more than $250,000, or both.6 °
Notably, this penalty is applicable to both the alien and the
alien's U.S. citizen or permanent legal resident spouse.6 1

"' See id. at 18-19.
52 Id. at 18.
1 Id. at 19.
4

Id.

11 Id. at 90 (statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Immigration & Refugee Policy).
56 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100
Stat. 3537 (1986).
"' Id. § 2(a), (d).
8 Id. § 2(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a (West 2014)).
59 Id. § 2(d)(2) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012)).
10 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c).
61

See id.
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1325(c)

Federal circuit courts are split on their interpretation of the
language of § 1325(c).62 While the statute provides that anyone
"who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of
evading.., immigration laws" will be subject to punishment,6 3
courts have differed on the nature of the intent needed to trigger
the law's prohibitions. 64 These divergent interpretations, which
frequently arise in the charging phase of trials,6 5 have resulted in
two different tests being applied when an individual is
prosecuted under the statute: the Build a Life test and the Evade
66
the Law test.
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to provide any direct
guidance on this matter of statutory interpretation. In the one
case in which the issue of § 1325(c)'s interpretation was appealed
to the Court, certiorari was denied.
The only tangentially
relevant precedent comes from the 1953 decision of Lutwak v.
United States,6" in which the Court adopted a form of the Build a
Life test in the context of determining a fraudulent marriage
standard as applied to post-World War Two immigrants to the
United States.6 9 However, this decision is not directly on point
given that it examined the interpretation of a different statute
than the one at issue in this circuit split.7 ° Additionally,
§ 1325(c) was enacted over three decades after the Court decided
Lutwak.7 1
A.

The Build a Life Test

Under the Build a Life test, a marriage is considered
fraudulent, and thereby punishable under the statute, if it was
entered into for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws.72
United States v. Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2011).
8 U.S.C. § 1325(c).
64 See Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d at 840.
6- See, e.g., id. at 838-39; United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701, 709-10 (7th Cir.
2006); United States v. Islam, 418 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2005).
66 See United States v. Aksu, Nos. RDB-12-00668, RDB-12-00669, 2013 WL
1898148, at *2-3 (D. Md., May 3, 2013).
67 Darif,446 F.3d 701, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1055 (2006).
68 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
69 See id. at 611-12.
70 See id. at 611.
71 See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
§ 2(d)(2), 100 Stat. 3537 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012)).
72 See United States v. Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d 837, 839-40 (5th Cir. 2011).
62
6
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Thus, if parties entered the marriage with the intent to build a
life together, such as by cohabitating or establishing joint
finances, then the marriage will not be a prosecutable "sham,"
even if the intent to gain improper immigration preference was
an additional motivation for entering into the marriage.7 3
Consequently, individuals who enter marriages for the purpose of
evading immigration laws may nevertheless be able to avoid
prosecution under § 1325(c). Circuits that have adopted the
Build a Life test include the First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.7 4
Courts that have adopted the Build a Life test have cited a
variety of rationales for this approach. For instance, in United
States v. Orellana-Blanco,5 the Ninth Circuit drew a distinction
between what it considered punishable "sham" marriages and
marriages that were merely entered, at least in part, to gain
immigration preference.7 6 The court observed that a spouse's
desire to gain immigration preference through marriage does not
by itself
establish that the marriage was fraudulent or a
"sham."77 The court reasoned that arranged marriages or
marriages for money may likewise involve ulterior motives, but,
as seen through their prevalence, these ulterior motives do not
necessarily render a marriage less than genuine. 8 Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit held that an "intent to obtain something other
than or in addition to love and companionship from that life does
not make a marriage a sham. Rather, the sham arises from the
intent not 'to establish a life together.' ,79
Other circuits adopting the Build a Life test have looked to
the evaluative standards of immigration enforcement agencies in
determining whether a marriage is fraudulent and therefore
punishable under the statute. 0
For example, in Cho v.
1
Gonzalez, the First Circuit looked to the administrative law
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") for

73 See

id. at 840 (internal quotation marks omitted).
" United States v. Yang, 603 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2010); Cho v. Gonzalez,
404 F.3d 96, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Orellana-Blanco, 294 F.3d
1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002).
15

294 F.3d 1143.

Id. at 1151.
77 Id.
78 Id.
'9Id. (quoting Bark v. I.N.S., 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975)).
80 See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
81 404 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 2005).
76
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guidance in determining whether a marriage was punishable
under the statute.8 2 In doing so, the court adopted the BIA's
rationale that the "relevant legal standard is ... whether [the
defendant] intended to establish a life with her spouse at the
time she married him."83
The Evade the Law Test

B.

Under the Evade the Law test, a marriage is considered
fraudulent, and therefore punishable under § 1325(c), if the
parties entered the marriage with any intent to evade
Any concurrent intent or motives for
immigration laws. 4
entering the marriage, however seemingly bona fide, are
nonetheless irrelevant under this test's analysis.8 As a result,
individuals can be prosecuted under this test even if they entered
the marriage with the intent to build a life, provided they also
Circuits that have
intended to evade immigration laws. 6
adopted the Evade the Law test include the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.
Courts that have adopted the Evade the Law test have cited
a number of rationales, the majority of which focus on a strict,
literalist interpretation of the statute's language. For example,
in United States v. Chowdhury,8 the Sixth Circuit observed that
nothing in the statute's language suggests that an intent to build
a life is an element of the provision. 9 Similarly, in United States
v. Ortiz-Mendez,9" the Fifth Circuit held that the only intent
required by the statute is the intent to evade immigration laws,
not the intent to build a life together.9 1 Furthermore, the Fifth
Circuit stated that § 1325(c) does not prohibit sham marriages,
but rather the circumvention of U.S. immigration law.92

See id. at 102--03.
Id. at 102 (citing Rodriguez v. I.N.S., 204 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2000)).
'4
United States v. Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2011).
85 See id.
86 See id.
17 Id.; United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701, 710 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v.
Islam, 418 F.3d 1125, 1129 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Chowdhury, 169
F.3d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 1999).
82
13

88 169 F.3d 402.
89

See id. at 407.

90 634 F.3d 837.
91 Id. at 840.
92

Id.
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C. DivergentInterpretationsThreaten To Undermine
Enforcement of the Statute
The conflict between these two competing interpretations of
§ 1325(c) often arises in the context of charging instructions for a
prosecution under the statute.93
In general, the charging
standard for violating the statute is that the government must
prove the defendant: "(1) knowingly entered into marriage;
(2) knowingly entered into marriage for the purpose of evading
any provision of the immigration laws; and (3) knew or had
reason to know that her conduct was unlawful."94 Yet, often in
such instances, a defendant will request that the court include
the language of the Build a Life test in the charging instructions
as well.9" This supplemental language would likely suggest that
defendants can only be found guilty if they did not intend to build
a life with their spouses when entering the suspect marriage.
By requesting the inclusion of Build a Life language in
charging instructions, defendants are actually requesting the
inclusion of a de facto mitigating factor that makes it more
difficult to garner a conviction.96 The Build a Life test is
admittedly a more forgiving standard to would-be violators than
the Evade the Law test: Under the former, a defendant may
indeed have entered into a marriage to evade immigration laws,
but may nevertheless avoid prosecution where such evasion was
not the only motivating factor. 97 Consequently, a judge who
acquiesces to such a request is imposing a more-difficult-tosatisfy, and indeed counterfactual, threshold of intent required
for conviction under the statute-that the accused entered the
marriage with no other intent than to violate immigration laws.
Moreover, the current, and potentially wider, adoption of the
Build a Life test stands to greatly undermine federal
enforcement efforts under § 1325(c).98

13 See, e.g., id. at 838-39; United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701, 709-10 (7th Cir.
2006); Chowdhury, 169 F.3d at 407.
14 United States v. Dimitrova, 266 F. App'x 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing
Darif,446 F.3d at 709).
95 See, e.g., Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d at 838-39; Darif, 446 F.3d at 709-10;
Chowdhury, 169 F.3d at 407.
9
See supra Part H.A.

97 See supra Part II.A.
98 See infra Part III.C.
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III. ANALYSIS: THE EVADE THE LAW TEST SHOULD BE
UNIFORMLY ADOPTED BY FEDERAL COURTS

A. Plain Meaning Interpretationof§ 1325(c) Is Necessary To
Devise, and Ultimately Enforce, CongressionalIntent
The circuit split over § 1325(c) turns on divergent
interpretations of the statute's language.99
The pertinent
language at issue is: "[a]ny individual who knowingly enters into
a marriage for the purpose of evading any provision of the
immigration laws." 100 Statutory interpretation is a frequently
addressed issue by the Supreme Court, and there is no shortage
of precedent on the proper approach.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that unambiguous
statutes should be interpreted according to their plain and
ordinary meaning, unless an "absurd" result occurs. 1 1 In
Barnhartv. Sigmon Coal Co.,102 the Court succinctly summarized
this approach:
Our role is to interpret the language of the statute enacted by
Congress .... "We have stated time and again that courts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last:
'judicial inquiry is complete.' "103
This emphasis on plain meaning interpretation is intended
to give maximum deference to the intent of Congress in drafting
the statute. 10 4 And in the case of § 1325(c), the plain and
ordinary meaning of the statute's language unequivocally
supports the Evade the Law test.
The language of § 1325(c) is not ambiguous. It prohibits the
entering of a marriage "for the purpose of evading any provision"
of America's immigration laws.0 5 This language contains no
qualifying requirement that such purpose be the sole reason for

9

See Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d at 840.

102

8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012).
U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).
534 U.S. 438 (2002).

103

Id.

100

101 See Lamie v.

at 461-62 (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54

(1992)).

104 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538.
105

8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012).
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entering the marriage, 10 6 as is required by the Build a Life test. 10 7
Indeed, nothing in the statute's language suggests that intent to
build a life is even an element of the provision at all.1 0 As other
courts have observed, the only intent required by the statute's
language is the intent to evade immigration law, not the intent to
build a life. 10 9 Moreover, the statute's language includes no
reference to "sham" marriages, which is what courts adopting the
Build a Life test have found the statute to prohibit.1 10 By its
plain terms, the statute merely requires that a marriage be
entered with any intent whatsoever to evade immigration laws in
order to trigger a violation.
Furthermore, an "absurd"' result does not occur under the
Evade the Law test's interpretation. The consequence of this
approach is indeed strict: People who enter a marriage to evade
immigration laws, even if as a secondary factor to an otherwise
legitimate motivation, will be subject to prosecution.1 2
Yet,
while this may strike some as being unduly harsh, it is by no
means inequitable or absurd. Such an approach simply results
in a blanket prohibition against any evasion of U.S. immigration
laws. This strict enforcement is in keeping with the fact that
Congress and immigration enforcement authorities desired
stringent prohibitions against the practice at the time of the
statute's enactment.113 Additionally, this blanket prohibition
confirms the rather common-sense notion that one cannot
partially break the law when acting in direct contradiction of
express statutory guidelines.
Conversely, an "absurd""4 result does in fact occur under the
Build a Life test's interpretation of the statute.
This
interpretation provides that one can enter into a marriage with
the intent to evade immigration laws, but so long as the spouses
also intend to and actually do build a life together, they can avoid

106
107
108

See id.
See United States v. Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2011).
See United States v. Chowdhury, 169 F.3d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 1999).

109 See Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d at 840.
11 See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c); United States

v. Orellana-Blanco, 294 F.3d 1143, 1151
(9th Cir. 2002).
"I Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).
112 See Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d at 840.
113 See generally 1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration Marriage Fraud, supra
note 3.
114Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534.
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conviction under the statute.1 ' Thus, the Build a Life test
results in people being allowed to act in direct contradiction of
§ 1325(c)'s prohibition against "knowingly enter[ing] into a
marriage for the purpose of evading any provision of the
immigration laws."1 6 This expansive exception serves to swallow
the statute's clearly articulated rule against immigration law
evasion, and should rightly qualify as an "absurd" 7 result within
the meaning articulated by the Supreme Court.
Some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court
has already addressed the issue of interpreting what constitutes
punishable immigration marriage fraud."18 The main support for
this theory comes from the case of Lutwak v. United States,119 a
1953 decision that dealt with interpretation of the War Brides
Act and, more specifically, what constituted a punishable
fraudulent marriage under that statute. 120 In Lutwak, the Court
held that punishable "sham" marriages under the War Brides Act
were those where the spouses did not intend to build a life in
America, but rather married for the sole purpose of gaining
immigration preference. 2 '
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Lutwak does not
provide controlling authority on the issue of interpreting
§ 1325(c), and in fact has been effectively abrogated by the
enactment of this later statute. 122 First, the very existence of a
circuit split over § 1325(c)'s interpretation establishes that
Lutwak is clearly not on point. 23 Second, the Lutwak decision
concerned a statute that is not at issue in this present circuit
split-the War Brides Act. 24 Third, Congress enacted § 1325(c)
in the wake of Lutwak, and its decision to adopt statutory

115 See supra Part II.A.
116 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012).
117 See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534.
118 See Marcel De Armas, Comment, For Richer or Poorer or Any Other Reason:
Adjudicating Immigration Marriage Fraud Cases Within the Scope of the

Constitution, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 743, 748-49 (2007).
119 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
120 Id.
at 611-12.
121 See id.
123

See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.

124

Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 611.

122
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language that does not mirror that earlier decision suggests that
Congress chose to depart from or, at the very least, not embrace
this earlier interpretation." 5
Courts Should Not Create a Build a Life Exception to
§ 1325(c) Where the Statute Does Not Providefor Such an
Exception
In addition to the need to interpret § 1325(c) according to its
plain meaning, this statute must also be construed pursuant to
prohibitions against creating exceptions to a statute when its
language does not support them. The Supreme Court has offered
guidance to this effect, as have leading commentators on
statutory construction. 12 6 As applied to § 1325(c), this principle
against concocting unsupported statutory exceptions clearly
supports the Evade the Law test's interpretation of the statute.
The principle that courts should not read unarticulated
exceptions into a statute is supported by Sutherland Statutes and
Statutory Construction, a leading treatise on statutory
In Sutherland's treatise on statutes and
construction. 27
statutory construction, it is observed that every word a
legislature excludes from a penal statute should be presumed
excluded for a reason.1 28 Consequently, courts should not read
exceptions, limitations, or conditions into a penal statute's
language.' 29 As applied to interpreting § 1325(c), this reasoning
dictates that the statute should not be construed by federal
courts as including excepting language akin to the Build a Life
test. The statute makes no provision for the ameliorative effect
of a marriage entered into for seemingly genuine reasons despite
the intent to evade immigration laws .130 Rather, the statute

B.

See 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59:8 (Thomson/West 7th ed. Supp. 2013-2014)
("[W]hen a legislature amends a statute following a judicial decision construing the
statute, courts presume the legislature amended the statute with that decision in
mind.").
126 See infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
127 Sutherland is frequently cited approvingly by many federal courts, including
the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters
Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2000) (construing federal bankruptcy code); Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311 & n.l (1994) (construing federal
employment discrimination statute).
128 See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 125.
129 See id.
125

120 See supra Part II.B.
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simply states, without any indication to the contrary, that a
person need only enter into a marriage with the intent of evading
immigration laws to be punished under the statute.' 3 '
Similarly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
creating unsupported exceptions to a statutory rule is often illadvised.3 2 For instance, in Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., the
Court found it inappropriate to alter statutory text in order to
satisfy the policy preferences of interpretive bodies. 133 The Court
added that these are "battles that should be fought among the
political branches" and that "parties should not seek to amend
the statute by appeal to the Judicial Branch." 34 In the case of
prosecutions under § 1325(c), many defendants are apparently
and essentially asking courts to do just that: adopt the statutorily
unsupported language of the Build a Life test as a de facto
statutory provision.3 5 Accordingly, courts should be hesitant to
amend the statute's language at the request of litigants and in
lieu of legislative clarification of the matter.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the presence
of exceptions in a statute means that courts should not read in
other exceptions elsewhere in the statute. 3 6 For example, in
United States v. Johnson,37 the Court held that when "Congress
provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts
have authority to create others.' 13 The Court went on to state
that the proper inference is that Congress considered creating
such exceptions in the course of drafting the statute. 1 9 Any
subsequent absence of further exceptions, the Court reasoned,
makes it logical to infer that Congress intentionally limited the
exceptions to those set forth expressly in the statute. 40
This principle should apply to the interpretation of § 1325(c),
given that the legislative package that created this provision also
concurrently created a key ameliorative exception in a related

U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012).
See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
133 Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461-62 (2002).
134 Id.
at 462.
131 See supra Part III.A.
136 See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
137 529 U.S. 53 (2000).
138 Id.
at 58.
139 Id.
131 8
112

140 See id.
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anti-marriage fraud statute. 141 Among its several components,
the Immigration Marriage Fraud Act of 1986 included
8 U.S.C. § 1186a, 14 1 which created a two-year conditional
residency status for those aliens who married a U.S. citizen or
permanent legal resident within two years of their visa
expiring. 143 Additionally, this companion statute requires that
the spouses in such marriages undergo exit interviews with
immigration officials to be further screened for fraud. 144 The
rationale behind this companion statute was that it would help
deter immigration marriage fraud by imposing additional
oversight of would-be fraudulent spouses. 1 45
However, this
substantial anti-fraud measure also includes a very significant
exception in the form of a hardship waiver. 146 The statute gives
authority to the Attorney General to waive this two-year
conditional residency requirement for selected alien spouses who
gained immigration preference through marriage. 14 Given that
Congress expressly created this exception to the immigration
marriage fraud regime created by the IMFA, it stands to reason
that Congress likewise made the deliberate decision not to
include a Build a Life-like exception in drafting § 1325(c).
C. Policy ConsiderationsCautionAgainst Adoption of the Build
a Life Test
While
the plain
meaning and express
language
interpretation of § 1325(c) alone supports adoption of the Evade
the Law test, several key policy considerations also advance this
position.
More
specifically,
and
indeed
somewhat
counterfactually, the negative policy implications of adopting the
competing Build a Life test bolsters the prudence of the Evade
the Law approach. These policy considerations stem from the
fact that immigration marriage fraud has increasingly taken
place under the auspices of large-scale, sophisticated, and highly
See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
§ 2(a), 100 Stat. 3537 (1986).
14 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(a), (c) (West 2014).
141
142

144 Id.

145See 1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration MarriageFraud, supra note 3, at
18-19 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, I.N.S.) (discussing the deterrence
potential of a two-year conditional waiting period).
14 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(4).
147 Id.
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organized criminal enterprises that are already adept at
exploiting weaknesses
within the current immigration
14
enforcement regime. 1
Criminal syndicates perpetrate a great deal of immigration
marriage fraud in the United States. 149 Countless official reports
and news articles have profiled the prevalence of immigration
marriage fraud networks through the nation. 15 0 These syndicates
15 1
operate in jurisdictions ranging from California to Connecticut.
They function by arranging for the marriage of an alien to a U.S.
citizen or permanent legal resident in exchange for often
considerable sums of money, both to the domestic enabler and to
the criminal matchmaker. 152 Government oversight agencies
have likewise observed the vast scale of these fraud networks.' 5'
A recent Government Accountability Office report detailed how,
in just one marriage fraud ring, forty-four individuals were
indicted in a decade-long scheme that obtained fraudulent visas
for hundreds of foreign nationals.'
Likewise, a number of
recent prosecutions for immigration marriage fraud under
§ 1325(c) have featured defendants who were participants in
55
these illicit matchmaking syndicates.
These criminal syndicates are also very sophisticated
networks of organized crime, both in terms of the parties
involved and the tactics employed.5 6 Immigration marriage
fraud syndicates have been perpetrated by such diverse parties
as members of the Mafia 5 7 to members of the bar.'5 8
148 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 13-15, 17.

See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 13-15;
Kurkjian & Borchers, supra note 42.
151 See, e.g., Cathy Locke, Immigration Consultant Pleads Guilty in Marriage
Fraud Scheme, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 7, 2013), http://blogs.sacbee.com/crime/
archives/2013/03/immigration-consultant-pleads-guilty-in-marriage-fraudscheme.html; Moroccan Man Sentenced for MarriageFraud, CONN. POST, (Jan. 12,
2012, 10:46 AM), http://www.ctpost.com/defaultlarticle/Moroccan-man-sentenced-formarriage-fraud-2489579.php.
152 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1.
149

150

113 Id. at 13.

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701, 703-04 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Islam, 418 F.3d 1125, 1127 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Tagalicud, 84
F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 1996).
156 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, 13-15, at 17.
157 Al Baker, Mafia Is Accused of Immigration Fraud To Lure Strippers, CITY
ROOM (Nov. 30, 2011, 4:46 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/mafiais-accused-of-immigration-fraud-to-lure-strippers?_r=0.
154

155
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Furthermore, these syndicates employ complex strategies to
ensure that the illicit spouses avoid detection. 15 9 Frequently,
they will brief fraudulent spouses on the screening methods of
immigration authorities and the steps that they can take to avoid
subsequent detection. 160 For instance, criminal matchmakers
will often instruct fraudulent spouses to exchange apartment
keys or to establish joint bank accounts, which in turn can then
be shown to immigration officials as fabricated proof of a bona
16
fide marriage. '
Congress was made aware of the role played by immigration
marriage fraud syndicates when it enacted § 1325(c). 62
In
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration in
1985, the Commissioner of the INS at the time, Alan Nelson,
explained the expansive prevalence and fraudulent creativity of
immigration marriage fraud syndicates in promoting this illicit
enterprise.1 63 Commissioner Nelson observed that marriage
fraud syndicates constituted a "thriving cottage industry in the
underground economy. "1 64 He went on to explain to lawmakers:
While marriage can be arranged for free, many cost in the realm
of $3,000 to $5,000. Some aliens have paid as much as $20,000
for marriage packages that include attorney services.
Numerous underground businesses, which cater to matching
the demand of aliens for cooperative "spouses" with the supply
of individuals willing to make an easy dollar, strive to establish
foolproof ways of foiling Service detection efforts. Some of these
businesses spring into life at the command of the most
legitimate of institutions; others are unrelated to immigration
law as beauty parlors and donut shops. What they have in

Van Smith, Maryland ImmigrationAttorney Pleads Guilty to Sham-Marriage
Conspiracy, BALT. CITY PAPER (Jan. 11, 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/
20130925170113/http://citypaper.com/news/maryland-immigration-attorney-pleadsguilty-to-sham-marriage-conspiracy-1.1255644.
-5See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 13.
160 See 1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration MarriageFraud, supra note 3, at
13 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, I.N.S.).
161 Id.
162 See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
16 See 1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at
13 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, I.N.S.).
11 Id. at 17.
158
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common are individuals who put the alien in touch with a
willing marital partner who, 65for a fee, will marry the alien and
petition for his immigration.'
Following this briefing on marriage fraud syndicates, thenChairman, Senator Alan Simpson, acknowledged the need to
implement legislative reforms to combat this practice. 16 6 And one
year later, in 1986, Congress passed such an anti-fraud measure
in the form of § 1325(c).6 7
Today, the Build a Life test ostensibly creates a loophole in
§ 1325(c) that allows individuals to violate the statute as written.
The Build a Life test provides that individuals can only be
convicted under the statute if their sole motivation for entering
the marriage was to evade immigration laws. 68
This
interpretation means that individuals may be able to escape
conviction by proffering evidence that, even though they married
to evade immigration laws, they nevertheless entered into the
marriage with bona fide intentions of building a joint spousal
life. 169
Allowing for such a loophole may provide an opening for
adept immigration marriage fraud syndicates to better
perpetrate this criminal enterprise. Organized crime syndicates
have previously proven effective at exploiting legal loopholes to
further their illicit goals. 170 This phenomenon is particularly
visible in the context of illegal transfers of firearms.
For
instance, a loophole in federal gun laws allows for felons, who are
otherwise prohibited from owning firearms, to avoid requisite
background checks and to legally acquire a firearm by acquiring

165

Id. at

13-14.

Id. at 90 (statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Immigration & Refugee Policy).
167 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
§ 2(d)(2), 100 Stat. 3537 (1986).
I" See United States v. Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2011).
166

169 See supra Part II.A.

170 See, e.g., William Booth & Anne-Marie O'Connor, Mexican Cartels Emerge as
Top Source for U.S. Meth, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2010, at A01 (discussing Mexican
drug cartels' exploitation of loopholes in regulation of global pharmaceutical trade to
seemingly legally, yet illicitly, acquire raw materials for drug production); Brian
Bandell, Cash, Condos & Criminals: The Big Loophole for Money Laundering, S.
FLA. BUS. J. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/printeditionl2013/08/30/llcs-offer-secrecy-to-foreign-criminal.html (reporting on the use of
limited liability corporations and their opaque ownership structure to launder illicit
drug cartel funds through United States real estate holdings).
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a weapon through and registering the weapon with a trust. 171
Similarly, felons can acquire a firearm in contradiction of federal
law by virtue of the much publicized "gun-show loophole,"
whereby an otherwise legal buyer can acquire the weapon and
then sell it to a felon in an unregulated, secondary purchase.17 2
In each of these instances, individuals or organizations engaging
in a criminal enterprise can and do exploit legal loopholes in
order to further their illicit commercial aims through erstwhile
legal means.
Thus, with a broader adoption of the Build a Life loophole, it
stands to reason that marriage fraud syndicates could adopt
measures to exploit this loophole and perpetrate more
sophisticated marriage fraud. In what would amount to an
almost belt-and-suspenders approach to coaching fraudulent
spouses on evading immigration enforcement, these syndicates
could foreseeably guide these spouses on how to avoid detection
and, even if they are detected, avoid conviction altogether. These
syndicates could create a pretext of legitimate marriage both for
the exit interview screening phase, as well as for any subsequent
prosecution for immigration marriage fraud under § 1325(c), by
encouraging spouses to take several common-sense procedures
that tend to prove the spouses intended to build a life together.
For instance, marriage fraud syndicates may encourage
fraudulent spouses to establish longer courtships to build the
impression of genuine romance and relationship formation.
Additionally, they may suggest that the alien spouses adopt a
more subtle, alternative payment system to compensate their
domestic enabler in order to conceal illicit transfers; such
payments might take the form of lavish gifts made to a U.S.
citizen or permanent legal resident spouse that are ostensible
cash transfers hidden in the guise of spousal affection. These
measures could then be offered in the event of a prosecution for
§ 1325(c) as strong evidence of the spouses' intentions to build a
life together.

171 Erica Goode, Trusts Offer a Legal Loophole for Guns with Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2013, at A12. This gun trust loophole has since been closed by executive
action of the Obama Administration. Juliet Eilperin, White House To Close 2 GunSales Loopholes, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2013, at A02.
172 See Reed Williams, Law Enforcement Officials Back Closing the 'Gun-Show
Loophole,' RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 27, 2012 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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The potential for criminal syndicates to exploit the Build a
Life test's loophole strongly supports universal adoption of the
Evade the Law test. The Evade the Law test does not provide
any mitigating exemption for those spouses who marry both to
circumvent immigration laws and to build a joint spousal life.173
This test's only inquiry is whether there was any intent to evade
immigration laws when the marriage was entered into.'7 4 This
narrower inquiry sidesteps an evaluation of other, seemingly
genuine motivations for entering the marriage. 17 5 As a result,
any pretexts of legitimacy coached by marriage fraud syndicates
will have much less bearing on the ultimate decision of whether
or not to convict under § 1325(c).
Additionally, § 1325(c)'s policy role as a general deterrent to
immigration marriage fraud further supports the adoption of the
Evade the Law test. This statute was passed in response to calls
by
immigration
enforcement
authorities
for
stronger
prosecutorial tools to combat immigration marriage fraud.176
Former INS Commissioner Alan Nelson testified before Congress
prior to the statute's passage that "[olnly aggressive criminal
prosecution can serve to deter this crime."17 7 Commissioner
Nelson further requested that statutory guidelines be clarified so
that "the alien's intent at the time of the marriage is not an
ameliorating factor."'7 8 In the wake of these calls for reform,
Congress passed § 1325(c). 79
Furthermore, several leading
policy research organizations have identified a link between
enhanced immigration enforcement and effective deterrence of
illegal immigration.8 0
Accordingly, deference to a strict

175

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.

176

1985 Senate Hearing on Immigration Marriage Fraud, supra note 3, at 18

173
174

(statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, I.N.S.); see also id. at 90 (statement of Sen.
Alan K. Simpson, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration & Refugee Policy) ("I

appreciate the thoughtful testimony; it was well done. I think there is a need for
legislation. We are going to begin to draft that.").
177 Id. at 18 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, INS).
178

Id. at 19.

179

Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,

§ 2(d)(2), 100 Stat. 3537 (1986).
180For a broader discussion

of the potential

policy benefits

of stricter

immigration enforcement, see generally BRYAN ROBERTS ET AL., COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, MANAGING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES:
How EFFECTIvE Is ENFORCEMENT? (2013), available at http://www.cfr.org/
immigration/managing-illegal-immigration-united-states/p30658;
JESSICA
M.
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interpretation of the statute that accounts for no mitigating
factor, as embodied by the Evade the Law test, is most in keeping
with the deterrence policy goals articulated to and by Congress.
Finally, Congress should also use the opportunity of any
forthcoming comprehensive immigration reform effort to amend
§ 1325 and settle this issue of statutory construction.
Momentum has been growing in recent years for a major
overhaul of America's immigration regime and enforcement
efforts." 1 Yet, in 2013, of the two main reform bills introduced in
the U.S. House of Representative and Senate, respectively,
neither make any attempt to provide clarity on the issue of
§ 1325(c)'s interpretation.8 2
Given the polarizing debate
surrounding and indeed imperiling many recent efforts to reform
American immigration laws,183 Congress should not pass at what
may ultimately be one of the few opportunities to make
contentious yet substantive and much needed amendments to
this statute.
Moreover, the prospect of partial or full amnesty being
included in a comprehensive immigration reform package only
adds to the need for congressional clarification of § 1325(c). Such
an amnesty provision has become increasingly debated in recent
years.8 4 Yet it seems that the underlying principle of amnesty is
that it is a one-time absolution of illegality, and not an
abandonment of our continuing duty to secure our borders.
Additionally, amnesty would result in our society incorporating
far more foreign individuals than policymakers have to date
authorized. The prospect of this massive influx in turn requires

VAUGHAN, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT: A
COST-EFFECTIVE STRATEGY To SHRINK THE ILLEGAL POPULATION (2006), available

at http://www.cis.org/Enforcement-IllegalPopulation.
I1 Jennifer S. Korn, New Momentum for Immigration Reform, with
Conservatives Leading the Way, Fox NEWS LATINO (Mar. 4, 2013), http:/!
latino.foxnews.com/latino/opinion/2013/03/04/new-momentum-for-immigrationreform-with-conservatives-leading-way/.
182 See generally H.R. 2278, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); S. 744, 113th Cong. § 1
(2013).
'm Ezra Klein, How Immigration Reform Is Scrambling American Politics,
WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblogwp/
2013/03/30/how-immigration-reform-is-scrambling-american-politics/.
184 Cindy Chang, In a New Era, Another Try at Amnesty; in 1986, a Path
Toward U.S. Citizenship Was Offered to 3 Million. Now Such a Step Would Come in
a Much Different Climate, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2013, at Al.
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that our nation redouble its efforts at immigration control, lest
our efforts to
overwhelmed.

incorporate

those

granted

amnesty

be

CONCLUSION

The Evade the Law test represents a proper interpretation of
§ 1325(c) in keeping with both canons of statutory construction
and Supreme Court authority. This test follows the plain
meaning of the statute's unambiguous language,"8 5 and refuses to
create a textually unsupported exception to the statute's
prohibitions.1 8 6 This test is also most effective at promoting the
policy goals articulated at the statute's inception. It is less
susceptible to ameliorative pretexts of marital legitimacy and the
18 7
marriage fraud syndicates who would promote them.
Moreover, it is a strict standard that provides credible deterrence
of marriage fraud and does not allow a fraudulent spouse's intent
to become a mitigating factor.188 As a result, it is reasonable to
infer that the Evade the Law test most closely evinces the intent
of Congress in enacting § 1325(c) and should be universally
adopted.
Given that § 1325(c) is the subject of divergent statutory
interpretation among the circuits, 8 9 the Supreme Court should
hold that the Evade the Law test is the proper interpretive
The Court has yet to address this issue of
standard.
interpretation, having denied certiorari in the one case in which
it was sought. 190 Accordingly, the Court should grant the next
petition on the issue of § 1325(c) and put a definitive end to this
debate in favor of the Evade the Law test.
Alternatively, this issue of statutory interpretation can and
indeed should be addressed by our nation's lawmakers. Congress
should amend § 1325 to provide additional, concrete guidance on
the issue of what constitutes punishable immigration marriage
fraud under the statute. Congress can do so by adding an
express definition of punishable fraudulent marriage, given that

115 See supra Part III.A.
186 See supra Part III.B.
187 See supra Part III.C.
188 See supra Part III.C.
189 See supra Part II.
190 United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1055 (2006).
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the statute currently does not feature any such classification. 91
Furthermore, Congress can provide guidance by amending the
statute's language to state that secondary motivations for
entering a marriage, however genuine, are not grounds to avoid
conviction under the statute.

'

See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012).

